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CASE COMMENT
NATIONAL ORIGIN AS A RETALIATORY
WEAPON IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE IRANIAN
STUDENTS CASES
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized
Congress' plenary power in the areas of immigration and nat-
uralization.' As such, the Court has restricted its scope of re-
view over federal statutory classification of aliens, noting that
it is more the business of the political branches than the judi-
ciary to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of.
aliens.' Congress and the executive, the latter acting under a
legislative delegation of authority and a constitutionally-based
foreign affairs power, 8 thus have been accorded virtually un-
fettered discretion in prescribing the conditions and terms
upon which aliens may initially enter this country.' Once
aliens have acquired residence in the United States, however,
the courts may accord them greater protection under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.5 The extent of this
protection remains unclear.
By permitting Congress or the executive to draw classifi-
cations based on national origin once aliens have lawfully en-
0 1980 by Gordon T. Yamate
1. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese
Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903). See also 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFImLD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 4.2-.3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GORDON &
ROSENFImLD]; Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens From Discriminatory Treatment by
the National Government, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 275, 317.
2. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976).
3. Id. See also Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
4. See 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at 1-36, 1-37.
5. See C. J. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE
GOVERNMENT § 9.27 (1969).
Such protection may be available where "the due process clause of the fifth
amendment incorporates elements of equal protection substantially equivalent to
those contained in the fourteenth amendment." Maltz, The Burger Court and Alien-
age Classifications, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 671 (1978). See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499-500 (1954).
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tered this country, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Iranian Students Cases' suggested that the fifth
amendment due process protections are very limited. The
court of appeals held that a regulation requiring only nonim-
migrant alien students from Iran to report to immigration au-
thorities did not deny the students equal protection of the
laws under the fifth amendment. In so concluding, the court
accorded great deference to presidential discretion in the field
of foreign policy.
THE DECISION
In the Iranian Students Cases, three nonimmigrant stu-
dents from the Islamic Republic of Iran filed a class action
suit seeking to declare unconstitutional and to enjoin enforce-
ment of an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reg-
ulation issued pursuant to presidential directive. 7 Such regula-
tion was promulgated "in response to the international crisis
created by the unlawful detainment of American citizens in
the American embassy in Tehran." Section 214.5 of the Code
of Federal Regulations requires, in part, that all nonimmi-
grant alien post-secondary students from Iran report to a local
INS office or an INS representative on campus to "provide
information as to residence and maintenance of nonimmigrant
status."' Each Iranian student is required to present, at the
time of reporting, his or her passport, evidence of enrollment
including payment of fees for the current semester, a letter
from school authorities attesting to course hours and good
standing of that student, current address in the United States,
and such additional information that the Service may request
6. Narenji v. Civiletti (Iranian Students Cases), 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2928 (1980).
7. White House Announcement, 79 DEP'T STATE BULL. 49 (Nov. 10, 1979).
It should be noted that plaintiffs are not contesting the illegality of the deporta-
tion where an alien has been determined to be in violation of any immigration re-
quirements. Rather, plaintiffs challenge the particular singling out of Iranian students
by the INS in determining whether or not a particular alien is in violation of his or
her visa privileges. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Presumably, had the
Service merely continued its routine enforcement practices, deportation of any Ira-
nian nationals under such practice would not have provided grounds for this equal
protection challenge.
8. Press Release by U.S. Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 13, 1979) (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review).
9. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1980). See also 617 F.2d at 746-47.
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for verification purposes. Failure to comply with the INS re-
quest or willful provision of false information subjects the
nonimmigant Iranian student to deportation proceedings
under the Immigration and Nationality Act."0
In the Iranian Students Cases, the challenge was based
primarily on the ground that the regulation focussed exclu-
sively on nonimmigrant Iranian students, rather than all non-
immigrant aliens, which constituted a suspect classification
based upon national origin." As such, the regulation would re-
quire strict judicial scrutiny and demonstration by defendants
of a compelling governmental objective in order for the regu-
lation to pass constitutional muster. The Iranian students also
alleged that the regulation constituted an illegal seizure under
the fourth amendment since the INS had no reasonable
grounds to suspect that a particular Iranian student had vio-
lated his or her nonimmigrant status, and a violation of the
Iranian students' first amendment rights by punishing Iranian
students in the United States for past demonstrations, chil-
ling their future exercise of those rights. In addition, the stu-
dents challenged the regulation as violating both the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and the Immigration and Nationality
Act-the former, on the ground that the notice and comment
procedure was improperly waived, and the latter, that the At-
torney General had exceeded his powers delegated therein.2
Defendants responded that the regulation, including the pro-
cedural waiver of notice and comment, was properly promul-
gated by the Attorney General pursuant to broad powers dele-
gated by Congress under section 1184(a) of the Immigration
Act. 3 In regard to the constitutional challenges, defendants
argued that: 1) judicial review of equal protection challenges
was precluded because the matter involved foreign policy de-
terminations by the President; 2) in the event judicial review
was warranted, the classification of Iranian nonimmigrant stu-
dents versus all other aliens was justified by compelling gov-
ernmental objectives; 3) no "seizure" under the fourth amend-
ment had occurred; and 4) plaintiffs' first amendment
10. 617 F.2d at 746-47.
11. The Iranian Students Cases, 481 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd,
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challenge was not pleaded with sufficient clarity."
In disposing of the procedural challenges, the district
court determined that good cause for waiver of the "notice
and comment" provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act existed and that the order for production of specific docu-
ments and information, assuming that the requests were con-
stitutional, were well within the scope of the executive's au-
thority under section 1184 of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act.16 In examining the due process challenge,
however, the district court engaged in an elaborate discussion
of the interplay of the established notions of the constitu-
tional guarantee of equal protection in classifications founded
upon national origin, the power of Congress over naturaliza-
tion and immigration with the accompanying enforcement of
such statutory policies by executive branch officials, and the
vast foreign affairs powers of the executive. The district court
first concluded that the regulations were not authorized, ei-
ther expressly or impliedly, by any "Congressional intent to
allow deportation proceedings to be instituted on the basis of
a national origin classification." 6 Although recognizing the
President's independent authority under his foreign affairs
power to act in this case, the district court further concluded
that "it is patent that the executive, even in the area of immi-
gration and naturalization, must be subject to applicable prin-
ciples of the Constitution. '1 7 Based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,18 the district court
recognized that the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment may require a less demanding standard of review
than traditional strict scrutiny since "there may be overriding
national interests which justify selective federal legislation
that would be unacceptable for an individual State."1 But,
the court required that when the federal government asserts
such an "overriding interest" to justify its discriminatory clas-
sification, it must also have a legitimate basis for presuming
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1137-38.
16. Id. at 1139-41.
17. Id. at 1143.
18. 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).




that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest.20 In
examining three possible interests alluded to by defendants,
the court concluded that only the interest in protecting the
hostages deserved consideration as "overriding."' "2 But after
assessing the reasons for singling out Iranian students, the
district court concluded that such action did not serve that
interest since there was "at best a dubious relationship be-
tween the presence of Iranian students in this country ...
and the safety and freedom of the hostages."' While the
court recognized that defendant's regulation was an under-
standable effort to respond to the hostage crisis, the classifica-
tion did not support a legitimate national interest and was
thus violative of the Iranian students' equal protection
giarantee.23
The United States Court of Appeals for District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, in a brief opinion, reversed the district court
on both the delegation and equal protection issues, concluding
that section 214.5 must be sustained. A three-judge panel de-
termined that the regulation was a valid exercise of the au-
thority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General under
the Immigration and Nationality Act. As such, the regulation
could distinguish among nonimmigrant alien students on the
basis of national origin provided that they were "reasonably
related" to the Attorney General's duties under the Act.' 4
20. Id. While this standard may be less demanding than strict scrutiny, which
requires that the classification be supported by a compelling state interest, it also
appears to be more rigorous than the traditional rational basis test. See United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955).
21. 481 F. Supp. at 1144. The district court rejected outright two possible justi-
fications-the need to express anger over the events in Tehran and the need to iden-
tify Iranian students-because other retaliatory actions could be invoked that would
accomplish these purposes without disrupting the lives of the Iranian students. In
addition, administrative convenience could not be considered sufficiently "overrid-
ing." Id.
22. Id. The court indicated that the regulation could be justified by the fear
that violent attacks on Iranians in this country by American citizens could provoke
retaliatory action on the American hostages in Tehran. Nevertheless, the regulation
failed to address this problem unless it could be assumed that only those Iranian
students who were in violation of their visas and could be deported were likely to
provoke such violent action by Americans. Alternatively, assuming that the mere
presence of Iranian students would provoke violence, the regulation did not address
the problem since those Iranian students legally residing in this country would re-
main targets of hostilities. Id. at 1144-45.
23. Id. at 1145.
24. 617 F.2d at 747.
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In addressing the Iranian students' equal protection argu-
ment, the court explained that "[d]istinctions on the basis of
nationality may be drawn in the immigration field by Con-
gress or the Executive."'" So long as the classification is sup-
ported by a rational basis, the classification among aliens
based upon nationality is consistent with the equal protection
requirement of the fifth amendment due process clause. Al-
though the circuit court determined that the Attorney Gen-
eral's regulation met a rational basis test, it asserted that the
contrary conclusion of the district court was indicative of an
impermissible extension of judicial power in passing on execu-
tive acts in the field of foreign affairs. Based on the United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp." doctrine of presiden-
tial competence in the field of foreign policy, court review of
such action is precluded in the absence of abuse of executive
authority. The circuit court therefore dismissed the Iranian
students' complaints.
Test for Delegating Authority to the Attorney General
In determining whether promulgation of section 214.5 was
within the authority conferred upon the Attorney General by
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the court of appeals as-
serted that "[t]he statute need not specifically authorize each
and every action taken by the Attorney General, so long as his
action is reasonably related to the duties imposed upon
him.' 27 In support of such "reasonable relation" test, the
court cited a string of federal decisions that have upheld the
Attorney General's discretionary authority in limiting the em-
ployment of nonimmigrant students,8 in determining whether
aliens admitted without a visa should be eligible to apply for
status as permanent resident aliens," and in permitting ex-
tensions of a nonimmigrant's stay in the absence of specific
statutory direction.80 Noting that the broad scope of Title 8,
25. Id.
26. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
27. 617 F.2d at 747 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
28. Ahmed v. United States, 480 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1973); Pilapil v. INS, 424
F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1970).
29. Fook Hong Mak v. INS, 435 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1970).
30. Unification Church v. Attorney General, 581 F.2d 870 (D.C.Cir. 1978). Al-
though the court failed to elaborate further, the court's dicta in Fook Hong Mak
appears applicable:
We are unable to understand why there should be any general principle
[Vol. 20
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section 1303(a), of the United States Code, authorizes the At-
torney General to prescribe special regulations for the regis-
tration of aliens and the maintenance of nonimmigrant status,
the court of appeals concluded that section 214.5 was "di-
rectly and reasonably related to the Attorney General's duties
and authority under the Act.""1 In reaching this conclusion,
however, the court must have first determined that Congress
or the executive may require that deportation proceedings be
instituted on the basis of a national origin classification.
National Origin as a Valid Classification in the Immigration
Field
In addressing the students' equal protection claim, the
court of appeals stated that, in the immigration field, "classifi-
cations among aliens based upon nationality are consistent
with due process and equal protection if supported by a ra-
tional basis." ' s While nationality has traditionally been an ac-
cepted criterion for admission into the United States, 3 the
court of appeals appears to have either not recognized any
change in the status of a nonimmigrant alien once that person
has become a lawfully admitted resident, or characterized the
power to deport as resting on the same constitutional founda-
tion as the power to bar entry.3 4
forbidding an administrator, vested with discretionary power, to deter-
mine by appropriate rulemaking that he will not use it in favor of a
particular class on a case-by-case basis, if his determination is founded
on considerations rationally related to the statute he is administering.
435 F.2d at 730.
Simply stated, if the administrator determines that certain conduct or a particu-
lar characteristic warrants favorable consideration, the legislature's grant of discre-
tion to accord a privilege may be accomplished by identifying groups rather than by
requiring a case-by-case determination.
31. 617 F.2d at 747.
32. Id. at 748 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
33. See 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §§ 1.2c-.4c, 2.1a, & 2.5.
34. See 1, 1A id. §§ 1.32, 4.2. The latter view finds support in a number of
United States Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
In Fong Yue Ting, the Supreme Court explained that the federal government has
absolute power to exclude all nonresident aliens, or to admit them "'only in such
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe'" 149 U.S. at 705 (quot-
ing Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)), and that the "right of a nation to
expel or deport [resident aliens]. . . rests upon the same grounds .... " 149 U.S. at
707. See also Comment, Aliens, Deportation and the Equal Protection Clause: A
Critical Reappraisal, 6 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 23, 46-51 (1975).
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In adopting the rational basis standard, the court cited
two principle cases where the United States Supreme Court
upheld, on an extremely relaxed standard of review, federal
immigration provisions that classified noncitizens on the basis
of duration of residency in the United States,"' and legitimacy
and gender." In Mathews v. Diaz, 7 the Court was presented
with a federal statute that conditioned an alien's eligibility for
Medicare benefits on a five-year residency requirement and on
admission for permanent residence. Plaintiffs, who were law-
fully admitted resident aliens, argued that the statute, by
allowing benefits to some aliens but not to others by virtue of
the residency requirements, impermissibly discriminated
against the ineligible applicants by denying them due process.
In recognizing that the regulation of aliens has been long com-
mitted to the political branches of the federal government
rather than to the states or the federal courts," the Court
noted that "the reasons that preclude judicial review of politi-
cal questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of deci-
sions made by the Congress or the President in the area of
immigration or naturalization." 3' In holding that the statutory
classification did not deprive the alien applicants of liberty or
property without due process of law, the Court required only
that there be some rational basis for the durational
requirement.
40
While the Court implied that the applicants in Mathews
might have received protection under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment,"1 the Court expressly
35. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
36. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
37. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
38. Id. at 81.
39. Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
40. Since it was "unquestionably reasonable for Congress to make an alien's
eligibility depend on both the character and the duration of his residence," the Court
concluded that the "case essentially involves nothing more than a claim that it would
have been more reasonable for Congress to select somewhat different requirements of
the same kind." Id. at 83.
41. Id. at 84. The Court noted that the strongest case in favor of the applicants
was Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1970), which held:
[S]tate statutes that deny welfare benefits to resident aliens, or to aliens
not meeting a requirement of durational residence within the United
States, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and encroach upon the exclusive federal power over the entrance
and residence of aliens.
1000 [Vol. 20
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recognized that equal protection analysis involves significantly
different considerations when the issue concerns the relation-
ship between aliens and the federal government, rather than
between aliens and the states.' The Supreme Court explained
that, to a great extent, states are only concerned with ad-
ministering programs for the benefit of their own residents;
thus, distinctions based on whether a person is a citizen of
another state or citizen of another country have no apparent
justification. 3 On the other hand, such "classification by the
Federal Government is a routine and normally legitimate part
of its business,"4 and such considerations would therefore up-
hold a broader range of classifications by the federal govern-
ment. By applying the rational basis test, the court in Iranian
Students Cases readily acknowledges that the federal govern-
ment's powers in dealing with aliens are broader than the
powers of the states; that is to say, it is likely that a compara-
ble state law provision would not have passed scrutiny under
the fourteenth amendment."
The second case, Fiallo v. Bell,"6 presented a constitu-
tional challenge to section 101 of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952,'4 that granted "special preference immigra-
tion status to aliens who qualified as the 'children' or 'parents'
of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents,"' 8
but, by definition, precluded the natural father of an illegiti-
mate child who is either a United States citizen or permanent
resident alien from preferential treatment as a "parent.'"
42. 426 U.S. at 84-85.
43. Id. Other considerations also exist that would disfavor extending fourteenth
amendment analysis in state alienage classification cases to federal cases. Unlike state
alienage classifications, federal classifications encounter no obstacles under the
supremacy clause. See Miller, Immigration and Nationality Law, 1977 ANN. SURVEY
oF AMER. LAw 205, 213.
44. 426 U.S. at 85.
45. Alienage classifications based on state statutes have been subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny and have been accordingly struck down by equal protection chal-
lenges. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state law denying welfare
benefits to all noncitizens and law imposing a residency requirement violated equal
protection rights of applicants); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (state civil
law excluding aliens from competitive civil service positions violated equal protection
clause of fourteenth amendment); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state law ex-
cluding aliens from practice of law violated fourteenth amendment equal protection).
46. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
47. 66 Stat. 182, as amended by, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1)(D), 1101(b)(2)(1976).
48. 430 U.S. at 788.
49. Id. at 788-90.
1980] 1001
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The Court held that the exclusion of the relationship between
an illegitimate child and his natural father from the prefer-
ence accorded by the Act was not unconstitutional. In taking
notice of the "long recognized power to expel or exclude aliens
as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Govern-
ment's political departments largely immune from judicial
control,"'50 the Court emphasized that "it is not the judicial
role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications for
the legislative decision."' 1 As such, the minimal standard of
review utilized by the Court in Fiallo rested more on a con-
cern for avoiding interference with the judgment of the politi-
cal branches of government, than on a concern for protecting
individual rights in areas that have traditionally warranted
more enhanced judicial scrutiny. In Iranian Students Cases,
the same concern of deferring to congressional and executive
judgment appears to override the fact that classifications
based on national origin have traditionally invoked intensified
scrutiny.
A review of Mathews and Fiallo reveals, however, that
the court of appeals was inaccurate in its broad statement
that "classifications among aliens based upon nationality are
consistent with due process and equal protection if supported
by a rational basis.""2 While the court correctly recognized
that Mathews and Fiallo concerned aliens from Cuba and the
Dominican Republic respectively,'" national origin did not es-
tablish the primary basis for discriminatory classification in
either case. Rather, discriminatory treatment was predicated
upon duration of residency or legitimacy and gender, factors
that necessarily cut across lines of national origin. In Iranian
Students Cases, the regulation expressly focused on Iranian
students to the exclusion of all other nonimmigrant aliens. To
conclude that nationality classifications may be validly in-
voked by the mere fact that aliens were involved requires a
strained and perhaps misguided reading of Mathews and
Fiallo."
50. Id. at 792 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1952)).
51. Id. at 799 (footnotes omitted).
52. 617 F.2d at 748 (emphasis added) (citing Mathews and Fiallo).
53. Fiallo also included plaintiffs from the French West Indies and Jamaica.
430 U.S. at 790-91 n.3.
54. Important factors do exist to distinguish Mathews v. Diaz and Fiallo v. Bell
from the present case. The regulation involved in Mathews concerned alien eligibility
1002 [Vol. 20
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Executive Competence in Foreign Affairs
Although the court of appeals determined that a rational
basis supported the regulation aimed at Iranian students, the
for participation in a federal medical insurance program. 426 U.S. at 69-70. At stake
was the loss of government benefits which, when compared to the risk of deportation
from this country, is a relatively small intrusion on an alien's individual rights. The
special preference immigration status in Fiallo pertained only to the entry of aliens
to the United States. 430 U.S. at 788-90. While decisions to allow initial entry of
aliens into this country are concededly within the broad discretion of the political
branches, Iranian Students Cases involves the question of the constitutional rights of
an alien once that individual has taken up residence in this country.
The court of appeals also referred to two secondary sources relating to constitu-
tional protection in the area of foreign affairs. 617 F.2d at 747. Professor Louis Hen-
kin offers two bases for using the national origin criteria: (1) "[wlhile foreign nation-
als in the United States are entitled to equal protection, discriminations among aliens
of different nationality apparently raise no constitutional difficulties if they reflect
...reciprocity for treatment of Americans in those countries; . . ." and (2) courts
could presumably uphold discriminations against aliens of a particular nationality
that reflect national foreign policy. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrru-
TION 258 (1972). In taking judicial notice of the American hostage situation in
Tehran, the court of appeals noted facts that would support either rationale. First,
the court recognized that the actions taken by the Attorney General were "a funda-
mental element of the President's efforts to resolve the Iranian crisis and to maintain
the safety of the American hostages in Tehran." 617 F.2d at 747. Second, in focusing
on the imprisonment of embassy personnel under treaty law, the regulation presuma-
bly offered a reciprocal response. Id.
The court also cited Professor Earl Maltz, who not only confirms the fundamen-
tal differences underlying the equal protection guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, but also distinguishes the Mathews rational basis standard from other
levels of scrutiny invoked by the Supreme Court to review cases involving discrimina-
tion against aliens by the federal government. Maltz, supra note 5, at 671. These
standards, based upon the nature of the discrimination and the relevant branch of
government involved, provide:
If the discrimination is applicable only to a limited territory, such
as the District of Columbia or an insular possession as in Flores de
Otero, and no "special national interest" is involved, then the same
strict scrutiny as applied in Graham v. Richardson is appropriate. If the
discrimination is nationwide in scope but is the result of agency action,
then a middle level of scrutiny is applied; the burden is on the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the discrimination is justified by reasons
which are properly the concern of the relevant branch of government.
Finally, if the discrimination is nationwide in scope and the result of
congressional action, then something much like the traditional rational
basis test is applied; the burden is on the plaintiff at least to identify a
"principled basis for prescribing a different standard than the ones that
are selected by Congress," and the Court will not impose its judgment
regarding the relative reasonableness of competing standards.
Id. at 685.
While Iranian Students Cases arguably fall within either the middle level of
scrutiny or the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test, the court of appeals deci-
sion indicates that it is clearly the latter that controls under the present facts.
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court implies that any contrary conclusion would necessarily
implicate the district court in unacceptable judicial conduct.
In recognizing the executive's extensive powers, expertise, and
resources in dealing with the Iranian hostage situation, the
court relied on the general proposition in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.55 that "it is not the business of
courts to pass judgment on the decisions of the President in
the field of foreign policy."" Citing dicta from Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy,57 the court noted that any policy dealing with
aliens necessarily invokes consideration of foreign relations,
war powers, and maintenance of a republican form of govern-
ment." The court concluded that any speculation as to the
propriety of the required reporting of the Iranian students
was a matter to be decided by the President that would not be
disturbed by the courts unless the President acted in excess of
his constitutional authority.5 9
ANALYSIS
The curt disposition of Iranian Students Cases by the
court of appeals leaves several important questions un-
answered. Moreover, the decision fails to reveal the court's
reasoning in sustaining classifications based on traditionally
disfavored criteria. Although the court cites cases indicating
that fifth amendment equal protection analysis may entail a
less rigorous standard of review than strict scrutiny, the court
emphasizes the protection of the political branches from im-
permissible intrusion by the courts. This concern has, in turn,
caused the court to place undue reliance on the power of Con-
gress and the executive in immigration policy in foreign
affairs.
Limits on the Scope of the Decision
In according great weight to Curtiss-Wright and Harisia-
des v. Shaughnessy, the circuit court leaves undefined the
precise limits on legislative and executive discretion in immi-
gration policy. Justice Sutherland's theory in Curtiss-Wright,
55. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
56. 617 F.2d at 748.
57. 342 F.2d 580 (1952).




that federal foreign relations powers inhere in this country's
status as a sovereign nation,s0 "might suggest that [such pow-
ers] are not subject to constitutional limitations even to safe-
guards for individual rights."s Under such a view, the court
of appeals' decision could be explained on the following basis:
since the power to deal with nonimmigrant aliens rests on no-
tions of sovereignty unconstrained by the Constitution, Con-
gress or the executive may draw distinctions on the basis of
criteria, such as national origin, that would otherwise elicit
great constitutional scrutiny.'
While such construction of Curtiss- Wright may provide
an easy means for disposing of the challenge to the immigra-
tion order, this view has been clearly repudiated by subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions that the plenary power of
Congress and the executive remains subject to constitutional
limitations.6 Considering then these limitations, it is plausi-
ble that the rather restricted judicial review in the Iranian
Students Cases rests more on a concern for the principle of
the separation of powers noted by the Court in Mathews v.
Diaz: "Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the
flexibility of the political branches of government to respond
to changing world conditions should be adopted only with the
greatest caution."
Nevertheless, if the separation-of-powers doctrine is the
basis for the restricted view by the court of appeals, it seems
patently unfair that such doctrine should bar further consid-
eration by the court of challenges based on individual consti-
tutional rights.65 Moreover, insulation of the executive to the
extent permitted in this case sets a dangerous precedent; as
the district court pointed out, it would "open the door to fur-
ther broad and potentially dangerous assertions of executive
power over aliens, exclusive of the protections the Constitu-
60. 299 U.S. at 314-19.
61. L. HENKIN, supra note 54, at 252-53.
62. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
63. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Justice Sutherland's theory of an
extra-constitutional source for the foreign affairs powers of the federal government is
not universally accepted. See L. HENKIN, supra note 54, at 23-28, 252-53.
64. 426 U.S. at 81.
65. Professor Henkin suggests that, "Curtiss-Wright itself exempts foreign rela-
tions only from the rigors of limitations on delegation inherent in the separation of
powers; it did not suggest that other constitutional limitations were also inapplicable
. ...." L. HENKIN, supra note 54, at 253.
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tion provides."""
Accepting the validity of the classification drawn in the
Iranian Students Cases, the extent to which such distinctions
based on national origin may be drawn remains unclear. As an
initial measure to commence deportation proceedings, the reg-
ulation specifically focused on nonimmigrants-those aliens
admitted to this country for a fixed period of time and for a
specific purpose.67 Thus, a question arises as to whether na-
tionality classifications can be extended to immigrant
aliens-those persons "admitted to the United States with the
expectation that they will remain [in the United States] . . .
indefinitely and will eventually become citizens"68 without de-
priving them of equal protection of the laws under the fifth
amendment's due process clause. In addressing the residency
requirements in Mathews, the Court disposed of this problem
of distinguishing between immigrant and nonimmigrant plain-
tiffs by upholding the entire scheme under a standard of mini-
mal review. However, the Supreme Court "did not explain
why the immigrant plaintiffs should lose the protection of
strict scrutiny merely because the classification also disadvan-
taged nonimmigrants." 9
The nationality classification might appropriately be re-
stricted to nonimmigrants. Nonimmigrants are admitted to
the United States with the understanding that they will re-
main only for a limited purpose and for a limited period of
time.7 0 Thus, their expectations of constitutional protection
may be less than those of immigrants desiring permanent resi-
dence. Furthermore, unlike Mathews, plaintiffs in the Iranian
Students Cases did not have to obfuscate the line between
immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens in framing their com-
plaint since section 214.5 narrowly focussed on nonimmigrant
Iranian students. Nevertheless, the treatment of this distinc-
tion in Diaz seems to indicate that the Court might not hesi-
tate to subject both immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens to
66. 481 F. Supp. at 1145. Accord, L. HENKIN, supra note 54, at 253.
67. Rosberg, supra note 1, at 312.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 292-93. Because plaintiffs in Mathews included nonimmigrant as well
as immigrant aliens, the complaint had to be broadly drafted to challenge the denial
of benefits to any alien. Had the facts been otherwise, plaintiffs might have en-
couraged the Court to distinguish between immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens. Id.
70. Id. at 312.
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the national origin classification.
National Origin as Grounds for Deportation
The ramifications of the court of appeals' decision are
particularly disturbing. By reaffirming the judicial commit-
ment to a narrow standard of review in the area of immigra-
tion, the court has, in essence, subordinated individual consti-
tutional rights to the interest of ensuring the unfettered
exercise of foreign policy by the political branches. Since
events of international violence and conflict necessarily in-
volve the executive's role in foreign affairs, nonimmigrant
aliens from a particular country plagued by such incidents
may be selectively singled out, as a retaliatory measure, in the
enforcement of deportation laws. Moreover, it is in such situa-
tions that the constitutional rights of foreign nationals law-
fully residing in this country become particularly sensitive to
abuse.
The argument that "this case primarily involves nonim-
migrant aliens who are in violation of our immigration
laws 7 1 and that "[the court has] never held that aliens who
are in this nation in violation of our laws have all the rights of
law abiding citizens of the United States"' simply begs the
question of whether the regulation can be constitutionally ap-
plied. The regulation specifically requires that all nonimmi-
grant Iranian students report to INS officials.7 3 Although only
those nonimmigrant Iranian aliens in violation of their nonim-
migrant status, or those who failed to report or willfully pro-
vided false information were subject to deportation proceed-
ings, the fact remains that enforcement of the law was
selectively aimed at a group identified solely by national
origin.
Such concern was at the heart of the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,7 ' where the Court determined
that enforcement of a public health ordinance 75 only against
Chinese-operated laundries violated plaintiffs' equal protec-
71. 617 F.2d at 750 (MacKinnon, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
72. Id.
73. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1980).
74. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
75. The ordinance in Yick Wo regulated the use of wooden buildings in operat-
ing public laundries. Id. at 368.
1980] 1007
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tion guarantees. 7' As in Iranian Students Cases, the particu-
lar underlying law in Yick Wo was not itself unlawful, but the
selective enforcement of the ordinance demonstrated such an
obvious discrimination by public authorities that it, for all
practical purposes, amounted to state action denying plaintiffs
equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amend-
ment.77 In Iranian Students Cases, the power to deport aliens
in violation of their immigration status was not being at-
tacked; rather, the focus is whether the federal government
may selectively enforce its deportation laws against only Ira-
nian students. While the fifth and fourteenth amendment
equal protection analysis dichotomy provides substantial
grounds for distinguishing Yick Wo, 78 it seems questionable
whether those factors warrant significantly different treat-
ment by the courts in these situations.
While the court of appeals found a proper delegation of
legislative power to the Attorney General in regulating the re-
gistration and residence requirements for aliens, the court ig-
nored the more difficult threshold question of whether Con-
gress itself could validly draw classifications on the basis of
national origin. It simply implied that such authority was
somehow conferred by the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Assuming that Congress could legislate using such criteria, the
scope of permitted acts by executive branch officials would be
at least that broad. By according only minimal judicial scru-
tiny, however, the court of appeals does not satisfactorily deal
with the Supreme Court's long-established view that classifi-
76. Id. at 373-74.
77. In Yick Wo, the selective enforcement of the ordinance was directed
so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to warrant and
require the conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the
ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities
charged with their administration, and thus representing the State it-
self, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical
denial by the State of that equal protection of the laws which is secured
to the petititioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the pro-
hibition of the Constitution.
Id.
78. See text accompanying notes 41-44, supra.
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cations based on ancestry or national origin are "odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality"' 9 and, as such, are subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.
Unlike the district court, the court of appeals found no
guidance in the Supreme Court decisions dealing with the va-
lidity of an executive order that dealt with the exclusion, relo-
cation, and detention of U.S. residents of Japanese descent
during World War II.s In Korematsu v. United States,s1 Mr.
Justice Black noted "that all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately sus-
pect,"' 2 and that, while such restrictions are not per se uncon-
stitutional, they do require "rigid scrutiny" by the court.88
The Court concluded, in Korematsu, that the order excluding
both citizens and noncitizens of Japanese ancestry from cer-
tain locations on the West Coast was constitutionally justified
by the exigencies of "real military dangers" existing at that
time." While this conclusion has been heavily criticized,85 the
Court's invocation of enhanced scrutiny of governmental ac-
tion when it is directed at particular racial groups remains
firmly established."
To the extent that the Attorney General's order in the
79. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
80. 481 F. Supp. at 1139. See Korematau v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945),
rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
Public response to the Attorney General's order that Iranian students report to
immigration authorities was mixed. While public approval of the takeover of the
American embassy in Tehran was nonexistent, a statement issued by a spokesman for
the Japanese American Citizens League urged the use of &ution in government ac-
tion against Iranians in this country particularly with regard to the protection of indi-
vidual constitutional liberties that might be harmed by policies based solely on ances-
try. See Pacific Citizen, Nov. 23, 1979, at 1, col. 1 (on file at the Santa Clara Law
Review).
81. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945).
82. Id. at 216.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 223.
85. See Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489(1945); Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: the Supreme
Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUMB. L. Rv. 175 (1945). See also,
Presidential Proclamation No. 4417 Confirming the Termination of the Executive Or-
der Authorizing Japanese-American Internment During World War II, 3 C.F.R. 8
(1976).
86. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Ma-
thews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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Iranian Students Cases was directed at noncitizens of Iranian
ancestry, the rational basis test applied by the court of ap-
peals seems somewhat misplaced. In addition, it is questiona-
ble whether the circumstances under which the immigration
regulation was promulgated constituted the sort of "gravest
imminent danger to the public safety" that was used to justify




The American embassy crisis in Iran has sorely tested the
patience and restraint of the United States Government and
its citizens in dealing with an outrageous and violent attack
on its diplomatic officials. But under such pressure, the courts
must not succumb to an expedient or less rigorous review of
the actions of the political branches that threaten to infringe
upon important individual constitutional rights. While not
doubting Congress' plenary power in the immigration field or
the executive's authority, either by delegation or under his
foreign affairs powers, the fact remains that such authority
87. 323 U.S. at 218. Three "overriding" interests were offered by defendants to
justify the discriminatory regulation:
1) the protection of the lives of the hostages held in Iran by quelling
potential domestic violence;
2) the need to express to the government in Iran this country's displea-
sure with events in Tehran;
3) the need to identify Iranian students to assist in the development of
appropriate responses to the crisis in Iran.
481 F. Supp. at 1144.
The district court itself indicated that had traditional equal protection analysis
been applied, these interests would not be "sufficiently compelling to meet the stan-
dard of strict scrutiny required in examining classifications based on national origin."
Id. at 1145 n.9.
But see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). In Harisiades, the Court
suggests that less compelling circumstances may be sufficient.
War, of course, is the most usual occasion for extensive resort to the
power. Though the resident alien may be personally loyal to the United
States, if his nation becomes our enemy his allegiance prevails over his
personal preference and makes him also our enemy, liable to expulsion
or internment, and his property becomes subject to seizure and perhaps
confiscation. But it does not require war to bring the power of deporta-
tion into existence or to authorize its exercise. Congressional apprehen-
sion of foreign or internal dangers short of war may lead to its use. So
long as the alien elects to continue the ambiguity of his allegiance his
domicile here is held by a precarious tenure.
Id. at 587 (footnotes omitted).
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must be subject to constitutional limitations."s
Under the rationale of Iranian Students Cases, the Presi-
dent and Congress will have wider latitude to use national ori-gin classifications as retaliatory action against nonimmigrant
aliens. Recognizing that this decision is unsound, the better
view is that "once an alien has taken up residence in the
United States, even temporarily, he or she derives substantial
protection from the Constitution and laws of this land."89
Gordon T. Yamate
88. Four justices of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, who voted to rehear the cases en banc, warned that "[W]hen the rule of law isbeing compromised by expediency in many places in the world, it is crucial for our
courts to make certain that the United States does not retaliate in kind." 617 F.2d at
755 (Wright, Robinson, Wals, and Mikva, JJ., dissenting).
89. Id. at 754 (footnotes omitted).
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